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ABSTRACT 
Many questions arose during the late 1970s and early 
1980s about the reliability of West Germany's relationship 
with the United States. This thesis was written to examine 
the relationship between the United States and West Germany 
during the post-war years, especially during the 
Chancellorships of Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and Helmut 
Kohl. 
The initial phase of U.S.-FRG relations was marked 
with a great deal of harmony between the two countries. 
The United States placed a great deal of emphasis on West 
Germany as part of its evolving containment of communism 
strategy. The FRG was recognized as a nation in 1949 and 
integrated into NATO in 1955. 
During the late 1960s under West Germany's Grand 
Coalition, a slow but steady move toward an Ostpolitik with 
the East led to tension. A major turning point was the 
1968-69 elections of Richard Nixon and Willy Brandt. 
The initial phase of West Germany's Ostpolitik was 
part of a global detente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
Bonn negotiated treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland 
in 1970, which led the way to a Four-Power Agreement over 
the status of Berlin signed in 1971. As global detente 
waned in the mid-1970s, relations between the two allies 
became more difficult. America's involvement in Vietnam, 
American troops in Europe, and the "Year of Europe" as 
called for by Henry Kissinger caused minor irritations. 
ii 
However, with the signing of the new Atlantic Declaration 
in 1974 and the Helsinki Accords in 1975, harmonious 
relations were once again restored. 
Increasing tension became evident during the late 
1970s. With the decline of global detente and the eventual 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States began to 
feel that the policy of linkage and detente had failed. 
The FRG desired to maintain detente as part of its 
Ostpolitik, as it had witnessed concrete benefits in 
relations with the East. As the policy of the United 
States shifted more to one of confrontation and 
containment, the FRG found itself increasingly at odds with 
its Atlantic partner. 
Several issues caused the Alliance partners extreme 
difficulty during the early 1980s. NATO's 1979 two-track 
agreement to explore arms-control agreements with the 
Soviet Union while at the same time deploying modernized 
Cruise and Pershing II missiles caused trans-Atlantic 
relations a great deal of strain. Hundreds of thousands of 
Europeans protested the stationing and the U.S. feared that 
West Germany would not be able to live up to its end of the 
agreement. This split in the FRG was so large that even 
the SPD, after being voted out of office in 1982, voted 
against missile deployment. The issue of trade with the 
Eastern bloc became an issue between the two countries, as 
President Reagan imposed sanctions to cancel the Siberian 
natural gas pipeline between the Soviet Union and Western 
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Europe. The FRG's response to the imposition of martial 
law in Poland and its improving relationship with East 
Germany led some American observers to question West 
Germany's reliability as a NATO ally. They feared a 
neutralized or "self-Finlandized" West Germany caught 
between East and West. 
While on the surf ace there appears to be many 
disagreements between the two Atlantic partners, when one 
analyzes the post-war relationship there is actually a 
great deal of unity. The basis for this unity is the 
common interest of the two countries to withstand the 
threat of the Soviet Union. After examining each country's 
views on the East-West conflict, the importance of detente, 
the role and structure of defense, the role of each country 
in the Alliance, and economic relations between the East 
and each other, it is clear that West Germany is still a 
reliable partner in the Atlantic Alliance. While the FRG 
has increasingly voiced its views on major issues within 
the Alliance, and while those views are not always in 
agreement with the United States, West Germany is not on 
the road to neutralism or "self-Finlandization." 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the post-war period, the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) and United States have created a most stable 
and lasting partnership. The United States has long 
considered West Germany one of its closest allies. The 
United States helped to create the country in 1949 and has 
guaranteed its safety during the post-World War II era. 
Close adherence to Washington's policies was maintained by 
the West German governments during the 1950s and 1960s. 
In the late 1970s, questions began to arise about the 
future of the partnership with West Germany. Issues rose 
to the fore that created feelings of ill will among the two 
countries. Headlines and newspaper articles appeared such 
as "Can U.S. Still Count on West Germany?," "Two Allies in 
Trouble," and "Bonn and Washington: From Deterioration to 
Crisis?," all of which questioned the reliability of the 
FRG as an Alliance partner.(l) 
Further difficulty arose when America began to 
question Bonn's commitment to NATO. Cries of 
"self-Finlandization" and fear of West German neutrality 
became evident.(2) Europe's peace movement became larger 
and more vocal. The Green Party began to call for 
neutralism and increased its size and strength. The 
leftist faction of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) helped 
give the impression that West Germany was on the road to 
neutralism. 
The "German problem" has long been one of history's 
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most difficult. This thesis will analyze the relationship 
of the United States and West Germany during the post-war 
era, concentrating especially on the Ostpolitik of Willy 
Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and the early Chancellorship of 
Helmut Kohl. Issues concerning the countries' relationship 
with each other will be examined. Was Bonn really on the 
road to neutralism during the late 1970s and early 1980s as 
numerous analysts argued, or were there other reasons for 
the difficulties in the two countries' relationships during 
this period? 
CHAPTER I 
GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE POSTWAR ERA 
1. West German Dependency and Integration into the West 
After World War II, the victorious Allies were unable 
to agree on a policy or a peace treaty for the whole of 
Germany. What evolved was a divided Germany, with the 
western occupation zones dependent chiefly on the United 
States and the eastern zone tied to its occupant, the 
Soviet Union. 
Immediately after World War II, the United States 
issued a harsh set of instructions on how to deal with the 
German population. Socializing between Americans and 
German citizens was prohibited, any elements of Nazism were 
to be eradicated, and the standard of living in Germany was 
to be drastically lowered as punishment for the evil done 
by the Third Reich during the war. However, these policies 
were only briefly executed. The U.S. forces provided 
considerable amounts of foodstuffs and increased the low 
levels of industrial production allowed in the occupied 
zones. 
With the evolution of the Cold War, the United States 
decided to integrate the western zones of occupation into 
the evolving Western Alliance. Washington viewed western 
occupied Germany as a vital part of its containment of 
Soviet pressure and aggression. Throughout the phases of 
West Germany's political development, U.S. authorities 
strongly supported the principle that the German democracy 
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should evolve from the grass roots and have a decentralized 
federal system. 
2. A Period of Harmony: 1949-1955 
The Federal Republic was founded in September of 
1949. It became a subordinate partner of the Western 
powers and of the United States in particular. The initial 
phase of US-FRG relations, lasting from 1949 to the late 
1950s, was a period of harmony for both sides. During this 
period, the FRG did not question American hegemony in the 
Western Alliance, but instead largely supported it.(l) 
West Germany's first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer of the 
Christian Democratic Party (CDU), achieved remarkable 
success in strengthening West Germany politically and 
economically. Achievements in these areas did not carry 
over into Bonn's reunification policy, which during this 
period was a failure. Adenauer's unification policy was 
based on two key assumptions: first, that Washington and 
Moscow held the key to the German reunification question, 
and second, that the balance of power would eventually 
shift in favor of the West. This would allow Bonn to 
negotiate from a position of strength vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union and eventually force the Eastern Bloc to make 
concessions. Only the first of these assumptions proved to 
be correct. Washington and Moscow did hold the keys to 
German unification. However, the balance of power did not 
shift to the West, thus the Soviets were not forced to make 
concessions to West Germany from a weakened position as 
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Adenauer had hoped.(2) 
3. A Period of Tension: The Late 1950s to the Late 1960s 
In the second stage of US-FRG relations, the period 
from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, Bonn was forced to 
make difficult choices between Washington and Paris. The 
conflicts that developed between the Anglo-American powers 
and France during this period immensely complicated 
Adenauer's aim of integrating the Federal Republic in a 
cohesive West European community. The United States 
clearly remained the indispensable partner of West 
Germany's security policy. However, France and its leader, 
Charles de Gaulle, were determined to reduce Anglo-American 
influence in Europe, and the French remained indispensable 
for West Germany's European policy. Nevertheless, until 
Adenauer's resignation in 1963, and initially under the 
Chancellor's successor Ludwig Erhard, close adherence and 
even subservience to the policies of the United States 
continued. 
After the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962, 
both the Americans and the Soviets realized the need for 
reducing the tensions that nearly led to a nuclear 
confrontation. The Soviet Union felt that by relaxing 
tensions it could import technology, particularly from West 
Germany and the United States, which would benefit its 
industries. 
For Washington, the German problem was only one part 
of the complex contest against communism. By the 1960s, 
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the United States was primarily concerned with the war in 
Vietnam, which was becoming an increasing drain on its 
military and economic resources. In view of increasing 
Soviet atomic power, Washington began to give priority to 
arms control negotiations with Moscow over the German 
reunification issue. 
4. Reunification as an Issue 
During the 1950s, the reunification issue was a vital 
concern to the West Germans and Americans. Solving the 
German problem was viewed as the most important step 
towards improved Western relations with the Communist 
Bloc. Beginning in the early sixties, particularly after 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the West 
began to feel that the only way to achieve peaceful 
reunification of the two Germanies was through detente. 
This was communicated to Chancellor Erhard by President 
Lyndon Johnson in 1966 during the former's visit to the 
United States.(3) It was now up to the Germans themselves 
to pursue a flexible "policy of movement" with the nations 
in Eastern Europe. The Social Democrats became interested 
in this idea and intended to take the initiative in seeking 
these contacts, short of diplomatic recognition of the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR). Egon Bahr, a close 
advisor to Willy Brandt, coined the phrase "change through 
rapprochement" to describe his program for bridging the gap 
between the two German states. As the United States 
continued to search for detente with the Soviets, Bonn 
7 
increasingly wanted to become an equal partner rather than 
a dependent of the United States in order to explore the 
possibility for an intra-European detente process. 
5. The Years of the "Grand Coalition" 
In 1966, Kurt Kiesinger became Chancellor of what was 
known as the "Grand Coalition" between the Christian 
Democrats and the Social Democrats. This coalition of the 
two largest parties in the German Bundestag (Parliament) 
gave them an overwhelming majority. The most impressive 
member of the "Grand Coalition" government cabinet was 
Willy Brandt of the Social Democratic Party, who served as 
both the Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister. 
The foreign policy of the "Grand Coalition" was 
largely a compromise. The two major parties agreed on a 
more independent foreign policy, less hostile to Paris, 
less dependent on Washington, and more active toward the 
East.(4) The "Grand Coalition" also began to change the 
way it dealt with East Germany, opting for a policy which 
tried to include the GDR in their detente efforts instead 
of attempting to isolate East Germany as past West German 
governments had attempted to do. 
An important part of this gradual change in foreign 
policy was Bonn's modification of the Hallstein Doctrine. 
This doctrine prohibited the German Federal Republic from 
establishing diplomatic relations with a state that 
recognized the German Democratic Republic, with the 
exception of the Soviet Union. Under the "Grand 
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Coalition," West Germany began to pursue establishing full 
diplomatic relations with the Eastern European states. A 
signal of this desire was the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Romania in 1967 and the resumption of 
relations with Yugoslavia in 1968 after they had been 
broken the previous year. In both cases, the politicians 
avoided conflict with the Hallstein Doctrine by developing 
the theory of "birth defects." According to this theory, 
the East European states were forced to recognize the GDR 
in the 1950s and thus the FRG could not treat them like 
those countries that chose to recognize East Germany. 
In conjunction with the attempt at establishing 
diplomatic relations was the drive to increase West German 
trade and credits to the countries of Eastern Europe. The 
primary aim of these increased trade contacts was to 
further the political influence of Bonn in Eastern Europe. 
However, the SPD went further than the CDU in several 
key areas of foreign policy, specifically in movement 
toward recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, the boundary 
between East Germany and Poland, and de facto recognition 
of East Germany. Conservatives in the CDU were hostile to 
these ideas. The result was that the "Grand Coalition" 
postponed progress on these critical issues, particularly 
in recognizing the status quo in Eastern Europe. 
6. FRG-U.S. Differences During the "Grand Coalition" 
Under the coalition, West Germany's relations with the 
United States were not as close as they had been under 
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Chancellor Erhard. Several disagreements between the 
United States and West Germany occurred during the CDU-SPD 
coalition years. 
First, the American forces in Europe were costing the 
United States large amounts of money. A powerful segment 
in the United States Congress began calling for either a 
reduction in American forces in Europe or off set payments 
by the FRG to reduce U.S. costs. Thus, in 1967, 1968, and 
1969, West Germany invested approximately a half billion 
dollars each year in U.S. government securities to satisfy 
the American government. 
Secondly, conflict over the West German currency 
increased tensions between the two countries. Britain, 
France and the U.S. pressured the FRG to revalue their 
currency upward, as huge amounts of foreign capital poured 
into the FRG. Initially, the West German government 
delayed, and only after immense pressure by the Allies did 
the West Germans revalue the mark at approximately 9 
percent above its former level. 
The final and most serious cause of disagreement 
between the two nations developed over the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), completed between the 
United States and the Soviet Union in 1968. The NPT was 
the result of six years of negotiations in Geneva. The 
intent of the document was to restrain lesser powers from 
acquiring nuclear weapons and to prevent their use in a 
regional conflict which, in turn might escalate into a 
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global thermonuclear war. Bonn feared that signing the 
treaty might imply diplomatic recognition of East Germany, 
which had agreed to sign the treaty. It also feared the 
treaty would both hinder the creation of a European nuclear 
force and prevent West German participation in joint 
nuclear planning, which it desired. Additionally, the West 
Germans saw the possibility of opposing the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty as a lever to extract concessions 
from the Soviets on the German reunification issue. 
Although the value of this threat is doubtful, it did seem 
the Soviets' main goal in signing the treaty was to deny 
the West Germans access to nuclear weapons. The Soviets 
made it very clear they would not sign the treaty until the 
FRG did so as well. The FRG finally signed the treaty in 
November 1969, but did not ratify it until early 1974. 
These three crises served to strain relations between the 
U.S. and FRG during the last year of the "Grand 
Coalition."(5) 
7. The 1969 Elections: A Turning Point 
Willy Brandt's accession to the chancellorship in 
October 1969 marked a significant turning point in postwar 
West German history. During the latter years of the "Grand 
Coalition," especially as the election approached, the CDU 
and SPD asserted their rivalry. The 1969 election campaign 
was more hard fought and far reaching in its consequences 
than any of the previous five elections in West Germany had 
been. Campaigning under the slogan "Twenty years are 
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enough," Brandt's SPD garnered 42.7 percent of the popular 
vote, thus receiving 224 seats in the Bundestag. The 
Social Democrats formed a coalition with the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP}, who won 5.8 percent and received 30 
seats. The Christian Democrats were out of the governing 
coalition for the first time since the Federal Republic's 
inception in 1949, even though they were still the largest 
party with 46.1 percent of the popular vote and 242 
Bundestag seats.(6} 
According to several studies on the 1969 campaign, 
foreign policy played only a marginal role. However, of 
the major foreign policy issues, detente was central.(7} 
All three major parties gave priority to the following 
foreign policy issues: relations with the GDR (concerning 
recognition and reunification}; relations with Poland (over 
the Oder-Neisse line}; and relations with the Soviet Union 
(concerning European security}. Each of the three parties 
differed in their positions on these issues. 
The CDU desired the traditional policy of overcoming 
Germany's division through self-determination. Priority 
was given to relations with the West, the alliance with the 
United States, and cooperation with NATO. 
The SPD differed from the CDU. It no longer proposed 
unification as a goal. Instead it suggested comprehensive 
agreements with the GDR in order to normalize relations and 
improve contacts. Additionally, the SPD wished to 
strengthen NATO while at the same time reduce the number of 
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foreign troops stationed in Western Europe. 
The FDP program went much further than either the SPD 
or CDU programs. It called for a state treaty with the 
GDR, renunciation of the FRG's claim to be the sole 
representative of the German people, and a guarantee of the 
security of Berlin with treaties between the two German 
states. Moreover, the FDP suggested a two stage program 
for the reduction of American and Soviet presence in 
Europe, including a European security system and an 
all-European cooperation program independent of the two 
super-powers. 
In 1969, a new administration had also taken office in 
the United States, led by Republican President Richard 
Nixon. Nixon wished to make the seventies an "Era of 
Negotiations," a fact born out by the President's state 
visits to Romania and to Yugoslavia in 1969 and 1970 
respectively, his 1971 reception of Yugoslavian President 
Tito, and his state visits to Peking and Moscow in 1972.(8) 
CHAPTER II 
OSTPOLITIK UNDER BRANDT 
In Bonn, the new Brandt government made it apparent 
that it wished to conduct an active policy with Eastern 
Europe, which became known as Ostpolitik. This reflected a 
distinct shift from the previous West German government 
position. Under Adenauer, the watchword had been no 
detente without progress on the German problem. The Erhard 
government intended to press ahead with detente while 
seeking progress on the German problem. A major shift took 
place during the "Grand Coalition" of Kiesinger and 
Brandt. Detente became so important that the West Germans 
were ready to make unilateral concessions towards improved 
relations and agree on a solution to the German problem at 
a much later date. During the chancellorship of Willy 
Brandt, the readiness for unilateral concessions became 
more evident and the acceptable delay in the solution of 
the German problem became much longer. The time was ripe 
for an active pursuit of detente in both Bonn and 
Washington.(l) 
The first step towards detente after Brandt's election 
occurred in November 1969, with the FRG's signing of the 
NPT. With the initiation of Brandt's Ostpolitik, the West 
feared that the FRG intended to loosen its ties to NATO and 
follow a more independent security policy or play off East 
against West. Bonn's signature on the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty was a sign of commitment to the 
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west as well as a signal to the East that the FRG desired 
detente. Ratification by Washington and Moscow was 
completed on 5 March 1970. 
1. Global Detente: The SALT Talks 
The main focus in arms-control talks now shifted to 
the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 
which began in November 1969. The agreement, signed in May 
1972 by President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, 
consisted of two parts. One placed a permanent limit on 
the number of anti-ballistic missiles the United States and 
Soviet Union could maintain. The other fixed the number of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) both sides 
could deploy.(2) 
The SALT I Treaty contained little to upset the West 
Germans. The United States had consulted all the European 
Allies on the negotiations. There were, however, two 
European reactions which emanated from the SALT talks, each 
of which to varying degrees lent itself to disagreements 
between America and Europe. 
One was the increased sense in Western Europe that 
detente was under way and there was little to fear from the 
Soviet Union. An "era of good feelings" had evolved and 
the steadily improving relationship between the Americans 
and Soviets meant that the Soviets were less of a threat 
than they had been formerly. 
The West Europeans also began to question America's 
reliability as an ally. The security of Western Europe, 
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especially West Germany, continued to depend on the 
guarantee of the American military presence in Europe and 
in particular upon U.S. deterrence of a possible Soviet 
nuclear attack. Brandt's Ostpolitik hinged on the 
maintenance of the security balance. Any negative change 
in that balance would be a blow not only to the FRG's 
ostpolitik, but to West German security as well.(3) 
2. FRG's Ostpolitik and U.S. Reaction 
Within a few months after his accession to the 
Chancellor's Office, Brandt initiated exploratory talks 
with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the German Democratic 
Republic.(4) The United States was initially ambivalent if 
not skeptical towards the West German Ostpolitik. 
Washington quite clearly favored improved relations between 
West Germany and her Eastern neighbors, and had for some 
time been urging Bonn to recognize the status quo in 
Eastern Europe. However, some Americans were concerned 
about the speed of Ostpolitik. They feared that the West 
Germans might prematurely grant concessions to her eastern 
neighbors and get nothing in return. According to a 
newspaper report of 5 December 1969, the deputy chief of 
the United States Embassy in Bonn had delivered a note 
complaining that the West Germans had failed to discuss 
with Washington preparations for an agreement with Moscow 
on the renunciation of force. Reportedly, this reflected 
the opinion of Dr. Henry Kissinger, then National Security 
Advisor to President Nixon, and not that of the Department 
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of State. The next day the State Department denied the 
rumor.(S) The main American concern was fear of premature, 
unreciprocated concessions on the part of Bonn. 
3. The FRG and the Soviet Union 
The key to any lasting West German detente with 
Eastern Europe was improved relations with the Soviet 
Union. Bonn, quite naturally, placed its contact with the 
Soviet Union at the center of its Ostpolitik. Initial 
talks were begun in early 1970 between Egon Bahr, Brandt's 
State Secretary, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko. On 7 June, after the initial discussions were 
completed, Bonn decided to open formal negotiations with 
the Soviet Union. Walter Scheel, Brandt's Foreign 
Minister, was appointed to conduct the negotiations. Not 
everyone in West Germany was pleased with the government's 
Ostpolitik. The CDU attempted to challenge Bonn's decision 
to negotiate with the Soviets with a vote of no-confidence 
on 18 June 1970. The attempt failed, as the CDU could not 
obtain a majority. 
Concomitantly, Brandt made a special attempt to keep 
the Allies appraised of the negotiation process with the 
Soviet Union, visiting Britain in March, the United States 
in April, and France in May of 1970. All three major 
allies voiced uneasiness, stating that any treaty must 
refer to the four-powe1Jl'responsibility for Germany and 
Berlin. William Rogers, American Secretary of State, 
expressed U.S. concern in a West German television 
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interview, stating that "any final juridical decisions that 
are made would have to be made in the light of those [the 
Potsdam Agreement and the Paris Agreements of 1954] 
reservations."(6) 
The Brandt government had no reservations about 
including and consulting the Allies regarding the current 
negotiations. Chancellor Brandt stated in a French 
television interview that "we cannot solve by ourselves the 
whole series of problems related to the subject of the 
present talks between the Soviet Union and the Federal 
Republic." He strongly felt that any change in the 
relationship between the FRG and her Eastern European 
neighbors would be "closely coordinated with our Western 
partners."(7) 
By early summer, the two sides had agreed on a 
detailed list of issues to be discussed. Unfortunately, 
this list was leaked to the press by Baron von Guttenberg, 
a right-wing member of the Christian Social Union (CSU), 
the Bavarian counterpart of the CDU. It became known as 
the Bahr-Paper. The opponents of Ostpolitik argued that a 
satisfactory answer to the Berlin question must first be 
obtained prior to the acceptance of any treaty. 
Additionally, the treaty must not affect "the right of the 
Germans for self-determination," that is, for 
reunification.(8) 
Brandt responded to this criticism by reiterating the 
pledge that no treaty would be submitted for ratification 
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until progress on the Berlin issue was made. Despite the 
revelations made in the Bahr-Paper, a poll conducted by the 
SPD in July indicated that 79 percent of the West Germans 
polled supported the government's position.(9) 
After extensive negotiations, the West German-Soviet 
Treaty was completed and signed on 12 August 1970 by 
Brandt, West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, Soviet 
Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, and Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev present. The 
treaty contained five relatively simple articles in which 
the two parties affirmed their desire "to maintain 
international peace and achieve detente." They agreed to 
further "normalization" in Europe in accordance with "the 
actual situation existing" on the continent (Article 1). 
Both nations "shall settle their disputes exclusively by 
peaceful means and undertake to refrain from the threat or 
use of force" in accordance with Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter (Article 2). They pledged to respect 
"without restriction the territorial integrity of all 
states in Europe within their present frontiers," which are 
inviolable. Specifically mentioned in the treaty were the 
borders between East and West Germany and between the GDR 
and Poland, the Oder-Neisse line. German reunification was 
not mentioned, but in a separate letter addressed to 
Foreign Minister Gromyko, Scheel stated that the treaty did 
not alter the FRG's aim that the "German nation will 
recover its unity in free self-determination." The Soviets 
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accepted the letter.(10) 
The American response to the West German-Soviet Treaty 
was generally favorable. Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, Martin Hillenbrand, stated before a 
Senate Committee on 24 June that "we approve the efforts of 
the German Government in Bonn to normalize its relations 
with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet 
Union," a fact confirmed by numerous other public 
statements by Washington officials.(11) 
However, under the surface of these positive 
statements lay misgivings about Soviet motives, 
particularly with regard to the Berlin situation. 
Secretary of State William Rogers stated that "the West 
would now expect tangible evidence of Soviet cooperation 
towards bringing about substantial practical improvements 
for the people of Berlin."(12) 
4. The FRG-Polish Treaty 
The U.S. had further misgivings about Ostpolitik after 
the signing of the German-Polish Treaty of Friendship on 7 
December 1970. Like the Soviets, the Poles insisted on 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line explicitly. Bonn only 
pledged to "respect" the boundary and offered a non-use of 
force provision to guarantee Poland's borders. 
Negotiations lasted through six arduous sessions from 
5 February to 12 November 1970. In the final document, the 
two parties stated "in mutual agreement that the existing 
boundary line, the course of which is laid down in Chapter 
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IX of the Decisions of the Potsdam Conference .•• shall 
constitute the western state frontier of the People's 
Republic of Poland" {Article I). The states also 
reaffirmed the "inviolability of their existing frontiers 
now and in the future" and declared that they "have no 
territorial claim whatsoever against each other and that 
they will not assert such claims in the future" {Article 
I). The Poles did withdraw their demand that German guilt 
for the Second World War be mentioned, and settled instead 
for the listing of Poland as the "first victim" of the 
war. The general emphasis in the preamble centered on the 
future and the necessity of establishing "peaceful 
coexistence." The Poles also promised in an official 
declaration, not part of the treaty, to adopt a positive 
attitude toward the emigration from Poland of "tens of 
thousands" of Germans or persons of mixed origin wishing to 
rejoin their families in either of the two Germanies.(13) 
Of all the Eastern treaties negotiated by the FRG, the 
Polish Treaty was undoubtedly the most difficult adjustment 
for the West Germans. The regions Germany lost meant a 
great deal, both economically and emotionally. The 
kneeling of Willy Brandt during a wreath-laying ceremony 
for the victims of the Warsaw ghetto dispelled more Polish 
suspicions about West German sincerity than any joint 
proclamation possibly could. 
5. The Four-Powers Agreement on Berlin 
After the signing of the treaties with Moscow and 
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Warsaw had been completed by Bonn, only the process of 
ratification remained. Throughout the negotiation process, 
the Brandt-Scheel government insisted that the treaties 
would only be ratified in conjunction with or after an 
East-West agreement on the status of Berlin had been 
reached. The negotiation process had thus been narrowed to 
a single frame of reference: the status of Berlin. The 
FRG had accepted the existing realities in the East and 
given de facto recognition to the Oder-Neisse line. It now 
expected the East to follow suit with respect to Berlin. 
For the past quarter of century, West Berlin had been 
the focus of East-West tensions. During this time, the 
city of Berlin had become the symbol of the problems that 
remained from the Second World War. It had symbolized the 
determination of the West to withstand communist pressure 
and maintain West Berlin's status as a free city. It also 
symbolized the permanence of the division of the Germanies 
and of Europe between East and West. There had been 
several attempts to settle the Berlin question, all 
unsuccessful basically due to the importance of Berlin to 
both the East and the west. (14) 
The United States had accepted the idea of a new 
attempt to settle the Berlin issues as early as February 
1969. However, there was a serious divergence of 
perception between Bonn and Washington over the Eastern 
issue. For the FRG, ratification of the treaties with 
Moscow and Warsaw was virtually a series of unilateral 
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acceptances by West Germany of already existing Eastern 
borders. For the United States, hard pressure on the 
Soviets had to be used if successful results on the Berlin 
issue were to be forthcoming. (15) 
The actual negotiations over the status of Berlin by 
the former wartime allies did not begin until March 1970 
and lasted throughout the entire year. The value each side 
placed on Berlin made it difficult to offer concessions. 
The Soviets viewed their authority in Berlin as 
indispensable for exercising influence in West German 
affairs. The U.S. felt its rights in West Berlin 
demonstrated its leadership in the free world and 
commitment to the ideal of self-determination. East 
Germany viewed with suspicion Bonn's design to preserve 
Berlin as a symbolic capital of reunited Germany. This 
symbolism led to a questioning of the sovereignty of the 
GDR. Finally, West Germany valued West Berlin as an 
extension of the Federal Republic's statehood. Any 
unfavorable settlement would jeopardize Bonn's sovereignty. 
6. U.S. Reaction to FRG policy 
After the signing of the German-Polish Treaty in 
December 1970, Bonn began to put increasing pressure on 
Washington to conclude a Berlin agreement, for the Moscow 
and Warsaw treaties could not be ratified until an 
agreement on Berlin had been reached. Relations between 
the two nations became increasingly tense, as evidenced by 
the visit of West German Economics Minister Horst Ehmke to 
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the United States for discussions with representatives of 
the State Department and the White House. On the surface, 
Washington reiterated its support for West German 
ostpolitik. However, underlying tensions soon surfaced. 
Brandt expressed his concern over a deterioration of 
relations between Bonn and Washington which he attributed 
to a "'constellation' of leading American officials who 
have become increasingly suspicious of his attempts to seek 
normal relations with Communist Europe."(16) Included in 
this "constellation" were Henry Kissinger, National 
Security Advisor, Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, 
Martin J. Hillenbrand, State Department expert on German 
affairs, former High Commissioners in Germany Lucius D. 
Clay and John J. Mccloy, and former Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson. 
The Germans expressed concern over the continued 
criticism supposedly attributed to these men in spite of 
the positive declarations voiced from Washington. Typical 
of the criticism was that of Acheson, who was quoted as 
"expressing alarm" over West Germany's Ostpolitik. He 
charged that Brandt was using his eastern policy as a 
"domestic political maneuver to hold together his governing 
coalition of Socialists and Free Democrats." Additionally, 
Acheson emphasized that Brandt's move to the East was 
weakening the West's bargaining position on Berlin and the 
planned reduction of troop levels in Europe. The fear was 
that Brandt would be entrapped by the Soviets in these 
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diplomatic adventures which would result in a loosening of 
West Germany's ties to the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, 
Acheson feared that Brandt was not receiving enough 
concessions from the Soviets.(17) 
This crisis in confidence was quickly denied by a 
State Department spokesman, who called the rumor 
"stupefying."(18) He emphatically voiced American support 
for Brandt's Ostpolitik as, reportedly, did Henry Kissinger 
to Brandt's representative, Horst Ehmke. 
Further support came from Supreme Court Justice Arthur 
Goldberg, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. He 
emphasized Brandt's past record as an anti-Nazi and his 
dedication to West Berlin as its former mayor.(19) 
Goldberg logically argued that through the NPT, Washington 
pressured Bonn to recognize the nuclear situation. With 
the signing of the Soviet and Polish Treaties and the 
prospect of an agreement on Berlin, Bonn was responding by 
recognizing the current political situation. 
This position was criticized by George Ball, former 
Undersecretary of State to Presidents John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon Johnson.(20) He argued that the West German-Soviet 
Treaty provided the West no tangible benefits while it 
contributed to a legitimizing of the Soviet Empire in 
Eastern Europe. He also expressed fear of German power and 
independence, a strong reminder to Bonn that many planners 
of American foreign policy still did not trust the West 
Germans. 
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7. The Berlin Agreement 
Finally, several weeks into 1971, an agreement on 
negotiating tactics and final conditions for the Berlin 
Agreement was reached between Washington and Bonn and 
harmony between the two nations was restored. A series of 
Soviet concessions brought an agreement on Berlin nearer, 
including a compromise in the concurrent SALT negotiations, 
the removal of Walter Ulbricht and his replacement by Erich 
Honecker as head of the GDR, and the announcement that the 
U.S.S.R. was willing to discuss force reductions in the 
context of a European Security Conference. 
The Berlin negotiations were completed in August 1971, 
and the Four Power Treaty was signed on 3 September 
1971.(21) The agreement basically represented an 
acknowledgement by the four signatories of the status quo 
of Berlin. The four governments agreed that "irrespective 
of the differences in legal views, the situation which has 
developed in the areas ••. shall not be changed 
unilaterally"(Part I, Article 4). The three Western Powers 
acknowledged that West Berlin was not a "part of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by 
it"(Part II, B), while the Soviet Union acknowledged that 
the FRG may "represent the interests" of the Western 
sectors of Berlin in international organizations and 
conferences and provide consular services for the 
inhabitants of the Western part of Berlin(Annex IV, B). In 
essence, the Soviets abandoned any attempt to maintain that 
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west Berlin was part of East Germany. They gave up the 
claim that East Germany controlled the access to Berlin. 
Unimpeded civilian access was guaranteed by the Soviet 
Union and any powers exercised by the GDR were to be used 
only on approval of the U.S.S.R.(Part II, A. and Annex 
I).(22) 
8. Ratification of Eastern Treaties 
With the negotiation and signing of the Quadripartite 
Agreement on Berlin, the road was now clear for the Brandt 
government to present the Moscow and Warsaw treaties to the 
Bundestag for ratification. Since 1969, the SPD-FDP 
majority had been steadily eroding.(23) Members of 
Brandt's coalition partners, the FDP, as well as several 
members of his own party had steadily been defecting to the 
opposition. When an SPD member changed parties at the end 
of February 1972, Brandt's strength was reduced to 250, 
only one above the bare majority. The Christian Democratic 
opposition used every opportunity to discredit or overthrow 
the Brandt government and exploited every hint of American 
reservation about the FRG's Eastern treaties. 
The first treaty ratification vote took place on 9 
February 1972 in the Bundesrat (upper house) and the 
treaties were rejected. It now became constitutionally 
necessary for Brandt to obtain an absolute majority in the 
Bundestag. 
The end of April saw another defection and an attempt 
to overthrow the Chancellor, which failed by only two 
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votes. When the crucial vote on the Eastern treaties came 
on 17 May, the Christian Democrats abstained, for they 
realized that if the treaties did not pass, their party 
would be isolated not only from Germany's allies but also 
from the majority of German opinion.(24) 
At the beginning of June, when Brandt gave his 
Marshall Plan anniversary address at Harvard, the Eastern 
treaties had been ratified, the Quadripartite Treaty had 
come into force, Nixon and Brezhnev had signed the SALT I 
agreements and Washington and Bonn were again in close 
harmony with each other. 
The series of agreements signed and ratified emphasized 
the change in government policy in both Bonn and Moscow. 
Since the end of World War II, Moscow's aim had been to 
consolidate and legitimize its rule in Eastern Europe. An 
important instrument of this was the specter of West German 
imperialism, which became the prime reason for Warsaw Pact 
solidarity. The West German hard-line policy had the 
effect of aligning the Northern Warsaw Pact countries 
closely behind Moscow, for fear of West Germany's 
territorial claims.(25) 
The FRG under Willy Brandt finally accepted the fact 
that reconciliation with East Germany would have to be made 
on Moscow's terms, specifically acceptance of the status 
quo in Eastern Europe, which neither the FRG nor the U.S. 
was willing to challenge. Conversely, Moscow also realized 
that it could not complete consolidation of its Eastern 
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bloc without dealing with the West Germans. They could not 
expect the West Germans to participate in a policy of 
coexistence without making concessions to FRG interests. 
The acceptance of the Moscow, Warsaw, and the 
Quadripartite Treaties by the FRG drastically changed 
relations within the Eastern bloc. East German allies no 
longer placed GDR interests ahead of their own, but instead 
placed their national interests above the GDR objectives. 
The Berlin Agreement particularly had a negative effect on 
East Germany, as its claims to West Berlin and its rights 
to regulate transit traffic were not upheld. It now made 
inter-German relations easier, as the crucial questions 
concerning West Berlin and the Oder-Neisse line had been 
answered. 
In September 1972, Brandt called for new parliamentary 
elections after losing a vote of no-confidence. The 
elections were held in November. The SPD won a majority of 
seats for the first time and provided the SPD-FDP coalition 
government of Brandt with a 48 seat majority, a substantial 
increase over the 12 seat majority of 1969.(26) 
In the same month, elections were held in the United 
States, with the Republicans and Richard Nixon returning to 
power in a landslide. Both men would resign their offices 
in 1974, Brandt due to the discovery of an East German spy 
in the Chancellor's Office and Nixon over Watergate. 
9. The Basic Treaty 
Brandt's election victory in 1972 allowed him to 
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continue his Ostpolitik by signing a treaty between the two 
Germanies. The leaders of the two nations had met in 1970, 
first at Erfurt, East Germany in March, and then at Kassel, 
West Germany in May. Little was accomplished at either 
meeting. Serious negotiations started in November 1970, 
when Egon Bahr, the FRG emissary, and Michael Kohl from the 
GDR initiated discussions. Agreements were reached between 
the two countries over the Berlin issue in December 1971, 
subsequent to the Four-Power Treaty on Berlin. These 
agreements allowed West Germany to represent West Berlin in 
international organizations and gave unrestrained access to 
the city, but denied the FRG the right to govern the city 
or treat it as a full-fledged state of the Federal Republic. 
Following these agreements on Berlin, it remained for 
East and West Germany to reach an agreement on their 
relationship with each other. Formal negotiations on an 
FRG-GDR treaty began on 15 June 1972. After strenuous 
negotiation, a treaty was finally agreed on between the two 
Germanies.(27) 
The Basic Treaty (or Grundvertrag) was a short 
document consisting of only ten articles, supplemented by 
additions, protocols, and letters elaborating on the 
Treaties provisions. The two Germanies agreed to respect 
each other's territorial integrity and to refrain from the 
threat or use of force (Article 3). Neither country could 
speak for Germany as a whole, as West Germany had 
previously done, and the national question was carefully 
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avoided, except to state in the preamble that the FRG and 
the GDR held "differing views on the national question." 
Collaboration on a large number of "practical and 
humanitarian questions was also agreed to" (Article 
7).(28) The treaty was signed in December 1972, and this 
act was followed by the entry of the two Germanies into the 
United Nations the following September. Washington looked 
with favor on the Basic Treaty. West Germany had finally 
accepted the fact the two German states existed, something 
the U.S. had urged for several years. 
10. U.S. Pressure on the FRG 
The year 1973 placed increasing pressure on the 
Bonn-Washington relationship. The Watergate affair, the 
breaking into the Democratic headquarters in Washington 
during June 1972, began to create turmoil in the Washington 
White House. By the summer of 1973, a Senate investigating 
committee indicated there was strong evidence that even 
President Nixon might be involved in the affair. The 
administration was increasingly unable to hold back the 
forces which endangered America's relationship with Western 
Europe, particularly with West Germany. The most notable 
of these forces were a group of Democrats led by Senator 
Mike Mansfield, who renewed their demand for a reduction of 
American troops in Europe. Although little concrete action 
was taken on the subject, it became increasingly clear that 
the Allies could not expect America to keep her forces at 
that level forever.(29) This growing call for American 
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troop reduction in Europe forced the Alliance to rely 
increasingly on the nuclear deterrent to contain the 
Soviets. While nuclear arms might be fully capable of 
detering the Soviets, public opinion in the late 1970s 
increasingly showed that the Europeans were against using 
nuclear weapons even for "demonstration" purposes in a 
crisis. 
Further difficulties were created when other 
Democrats, led by Senator Henry Jackson, called for the 
linkage of the U.S.S.R.'s most-favored-nation-status to 
Soviet emigration policy for Jewish citizens. This 
amendment was attached to the President's Trade Bill, which 
would have allowed him to negotiate a new set of General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules with Europe. 
On 7 November, Nixon announced that he was abandoning the 
attempt for Congressional approval of the bill, for in its 
present form it would have damaged detente with the Soviet 
Union. The postponement of the bill meant GATT 
negotiations would not begin until at least the summer of 
1974. European reaction to the delay of the GATT bill was 
mixed. Some felt it was not necessary for early 
negotiations, while most, including West Germany, felt the 
postponement represented an American victory over European 
interests.(30) 
Americans also found unwelcome forces in West German 
political life during 1973. A youth section in the SPD, 
the Jungsozialisten, developed and became very outspoken 
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towards American policy in Vietnam and the American 
military presence in Europe. Additionally, late in 1973, a 
widely circulated article of an off-the-record interview 
given by Egon Bahr, political advisor to Brandt, appeared 
in the quarterly journal Orbis. In the article, Bahr 
states that the ultimate goal of Ostpolitik was a European 
collective security system in which the two Germanies would 
come close together, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be 
dissolved. The West German government distanced itself 
from Bahr's remarks, explaining that the remarks were not 
Bonn policy but merely speculation by a foreign policy 
planner, an explanation that was accepted by the United 
States government.(31) 
Greater difficulty arose over what Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger termed as the "Year of Europe" in a speech 
given in April 1973.(32) The "Year of Europe" phrase was 
first used by President Nixon in the inauguration ceremony 
at the beginning of his second term and reiterated in a 
U.S. foreign policy report Nixon issued to Congress on 3 
May 1973. To the Americans, the term was meant to imply 
that in 1973 the U.S. would turn towards improving 
relations with its European allies after achieving a 
breakthrough in relations with the Soviets and Chinese in 
1972. The U.S. voiced its support for European unification 
efforts and promised to continue to do so in order to 
strengthen the West. In his April speech on the subject, 
Kissinger stated that the U.S. would " . maintain our 
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forces and not withdraw from Europe unilaterally. In turn, 
we expect from each ally a fair share of the common effort 
for the common defense." He called for the Europeans to 
cooperate in working out "a new Atlantic Charter setting 
the goals for the future a blueprint that •.• creates 
for the Atlantic nations a new relationship in whose 
progress Japan can share."(33) 
The statements by Nixon and Kissinger received mixed 
reviews. Many Europeans gained the impression that 
Kissinger and Nixon wanted to put Europe in its place. 
However, these suggestions by the U.S. did view Europe as a 
unit, something the Europeans had urged the Americans to do 
for a period of years. Few, if any concrete proposals were 
offered in the speech, only principles and questions. The 
West German response was to accept the aim of redefining 
the Alliance while at the same time allowing the European 
states to work out their own positions rather that accept 
the American view uncritically. The task of writing this 
new "Atlantic Charter" was given to the European Community 
(EC) and NATO, who were to each write a separate draft. 
The EC draft appeared first, but was rejected by Kissinger 
who called the document a "bland statement lacking in 
substance."(34) 
The Americans modified the text of the EC draft, but 
used the words "interdependence" and "partnership," which 
were unacceptable to the French.(35) Finally, the NATO 
version written on the basis of a French draft appeared in 
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late November, but by this time, Kissinger's appeal was 
interrupted by the Middle East crisis of October 1973.(36) 
The Arab-Israeli War sparked increased differences 
between the U.S. and FRG. The American commitment to 
Israel was very clear from the beginning, as was the 
pro-Arab position of the European states due to their 
dependence on Arab oil. 
Initially, the FRG took a neutral position in the 
Middle East conflict. In the beginning, the West Germans 
allowed the U.S. to use their bases in the Federal Republic 
for deliveries of war materials to Israel. However, when 
these deliveries continued after the cease-fire agreement 
of 22 October, the West German government became concerned 
about their relations with the Arabs and asked the U.S. to 
cease the deliveries. This caused great consternation in 
Washington. Kissinger informed the West German ambassador 
that the U.S. reserved the right to take any action it 
regarded as right in the interests of national security.(37) 
Even these 1973 crises did little to damage seriously 
the U.S.-FRG relationship. Both nations continued to deal 
constructively with the problems each faced, and mutual 
interdependence helped to maintain stability. However, the 
Middle East crisis did point to the fact that an agreed 
point of view between the U.S. and FRG could no longer be 
taken for granted. 
Relations in 1974 generally improved from their 1973 
low during the Yorn Kippur War. The Atlantic Declaration 
35 
called for by Henry Kissinger during the "Year of Europe" 
speech was finally signed in June 1974, almost fourteen 
months after Kissinger's original appeal.(38) Although the 
text of this document did not contain the far-reaching 
"blueprint for the future" Kissinger had called for, it did 
pledge the alliance to more effective consultation in the 
future. 
During 1974, both the FRG and U.S. experienced a 
change of leadership. Willy Brandt resigned in May upon 
the discovery that an East German spy had been operating in 
the Chancellor's Office. It was clear, however, that 
deeper reasons led to Brandt's resignation. The strains of 
coalition politics had obviously taken their toll on Brandt 
as well as the threatened disintegration of the EC. 
Brandt's successor was Helmut Schmidt, a man who had 
previously served as Minister of Defense and Minister of 
Finance. A change was also made in the foreign ministry, 
as Hans-Dietrich Genscher from the FDP replaced Walter 
Scheel, who was sworn in as President of the Federal 
Republic. In the U.S., Richard Nixon resigned as President 
in August. Vice-President Gerald Ford moved into the White 
House, but his term as President was to be of short 
duration and had little effect on West German-American 
relations.(40) 
11. The Climax of Detente: The Helsinki Accords 
During the following year, an event occurred that had 
a great effect on West German-American relations. The 
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climax of the "Era of Negotiations" between East and West, 
which had begun with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
occurred in August 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act. This document was the consummation of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
The Conference had opened in July 1973 in Helsinki and had 
reconvened in Geneva later that year. Results from this 
conference were initially expected in early 1974, but were 
delayed until 1975. 
The CSCE had been proposed by the Soviets for many 
years, originally to sanction the status quo in Europe 
after World War II. The agreements signed between West 
Germany and the Eastern Europeans during the early 1970s 
seemed to remove the need for a general European 
conference, but the Soviets continued to urge that a 
meeting be held.(39) Since it was the Soviets that desired 
the conference, the Western powers were able to gain 
concessions on a number of other issues, such as the Berlin 
Agreement, Soviet restraint during the Middle East crisis 
of 1973, and an agenda for the talks which discussed such 
issues as human rights and the free movement of people and 
information. 
One of the interesting features of this conference was 
the effectiveness in which the European Community 
coordinated its views. The final document signed by the 
thirty-three continental European states (all except 
Albania), as well as the U.S. and Canada, contained three 
37 
major "baskets."(41) 
The original Soviet motives in promoting Helsinki were 
expressed by the document's statement that "the 
participating states regard as inviolable each other's 
frontiers, as well as the frontiers of all states in 
Europe." Additional statements were added concerning the 
elimination of the use of force and pledging 
non-interference in internal affairs of other nations. 
"Basket Two" contained ways to improve cultural, 
scientific, and economic cooperation, many of which were 
already in practice. The famous "Basket Three" of the 
Helsinki Final Act contained provisions which required the 
signatories to "ease regulations concerning movement of 
citizens from other participating states in their 
territory" and allow contact between religious and 
professional organizations of various nations. 
The main thrust of the human rights agreements is 
found in the introductory declaration, which stated that 
"the participating states will respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion. . • . They will promote and 
encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, 
economic, social, cultural, and other rights ••. [which] 
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person."(42) 
The CSCE talks served to cement Bonn's Ostpolitik into 
Western Alliance policy, for while they confirmed the 
political and territorial status quo in Europe, the 
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conference also made Brandt's policy part of a larger 
European and global movement. The Helsinki Agreement stood 
as the climax and beginning of the decline of U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
and inter-German detente. Both the Soviets and the East 
Germans had achieved their main goal of confirming Europe's 
status quo. Their incentive to cooperate with the West 
subsequently declined. The Soviet Union increased its 
activities in the Third World and continued its military 
build-up through the deployment of SS-20 medium-range 
missiles. Western public opinion grew increasingly 
disillusioned with detente. 
CHAPTER III 
OSTPOLITIK AND THE DECLINE OF GLOBAL DETENTE: 1976-1980 
There were many changes in the relationship between 
the U.S. and FRG during the mid-1970s and early 1980s. One 
factor, however, remained a constant, and that was the 
Chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt. During his government, 
west Germany continued to increase its influence within 
NATO and the European Community. Evidence of this growing 
stature may be found in the publication of such articles as 
"Germany Steps Up," and "A new political giant? West 
German foreign policy in the 1970s."(l) This was not the 
only testimony to the growing power of the FRG. 
Additionally, the FRG came through the mid-1970s recession 
in better shape than many of the other European powers. By 
the late 1970s, the West German's held one-third of the 
wealth of the European Community and the German mark was 
much more stable than the dollar on the international money 
market.(2) 
The rising economic power of West Germany coupled with 
the relative stability of the West German government 
compared with many of the NATO powers allowed Chancellor 
Schmidt to speak more independently than many of his 
predecessors on world issues. It was this outspokeness 
that caused a great deal of friction between the German 
Chancellor and newly elected President Jimmy Carter. 
During their mutual time in office, several key issues 




1. The Issue of Human Rights 
A major source of strain in the Bonn-Washington 
relationship was the differing method used by both 
governments to approach world problems. The government of 
Jimmy Carter pref erred to view the world in idealistic 
terms. This idealism was the worst kind of approach from 
Schmidt's point of view, who looked at problems from a more 
tough minded, pragmatic perspective. In addition to the 
divergent styles of the two governments, there were major 
differences in dealing with problems that occurred during 
the Carter-Schmidt years. 
When President Carter took office in January 1977, he 
made it very clear that one of the central planks of his 
foreign policy would be the issue of human rights. Yet, 
this was not an evenhanded policy. Carter was specifically 
critical of the Soviet Union for their violation of human 
rights, but overlooked obvious violations by other world 
countries when it was convenient to do so. Since neither 
Chile nor Brazil, Idi Amin nor the Shah, was condemned for 
human rights violations during the initial months of 
Carter's presidency, it became clear to many that this 
crusade for human rights had simply degenerated into a 
renewed antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
One concrete example came from the country of Iran and its 
leader, the Shah. At a state dinner for the Shah in 
January 1977, President Carter praised the Iranian leader 
41 
for his "great leadership" and stated that n •. there is 
no leader with whom I have a deeper sense of personal 
gratitude and personal friendship."(3) Yet in December 
1978, when the Shah was on the verge of being overthrown, 
Carter commented on the "difference in human rights values. 
There have been abuses ..• under the Shah's 
government that would not be acceptable in our own 
country."(4) 
Although Chancellor Schmidt agreed in principle with 
the position of the United States, he regarded the specific 
condemnation of the Soviets as unproductive. It was his 
contention that the status of the 17 million Germans in the 
GDR and the chances for emigration of German minorities 
throughout Eastern Europe could only be improved through 
patient, quite negotiation, not public criticism.(5) 
2. The FRG Nuclear Deal with Brazil 
A further difficulty between the U.S. and FRG emerged 
early in 1977 with the proposed sale of a nuclear 
reprocessing plant to Brazil by the West Germans. The 
Federal Republic's reliance on imported energy, emphasized 
by the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, led to the active 
pursuit of nuclear energy production. In turn, this led to 
the FRG's development as one of the leading exporters of 
nuclear technology. On 27 June 1975, a deal was struck 
between the FRG and Brazil for the sale of eight nuclear 
power stations and an uranium enrichment plant. This sale 
was the largest nuclear transaction in the history of the 
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atomic age ($4 billion) and it was also the first sale of 
fuel and reactor technologies together.(6) It would also 
provide Brazil with the capability of manufacturing nuclear 
weapons, a fact that was underscored by Brazil's 
non-ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
In Washington, particularly among members of Congress, 
the prospect of the Brazilians acquiring a nuclear 
capability aroused fear that the deal would set a precedent 
for other non-nuclear nations to demand the fuel-cycle 
technology. This would undermine the premise of American 
diplomacy that rested on nuclear non-proliferation. The 
American attitude was reflected in a New York Times article 
which stated that this "reckless move could set off a 
nuclear arms race in Latin America, trigger the nuclear 
arming of a half-dozen nations elsewhere, and endanger the 
security of the United States and the world as a 
whole."(7) Initially, the U.S. government attempted to 
scuttle the deal. However, sensing that the cost to Bonn 
would be too great if the sale was cancelled, Washington 
urged that several changes be made in the deal. These 
changes included safeguards and control arrangements 
stricter than in any previous major sale to a non-Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty signee. Although both President Ford 
and Secretary of State Kissinger were uneasy about the 
deal, Kissinger felt the changes the West Germans had made 
at the American's request were sufficient. Thus the West 
Germans signed the agreement. 
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For the FRG, the loss of this sale would have meant 
the loss of $4 billion in revenue, which was hoped to help 
finance West Germany's own nuclear program and would also 
cost or endanger the security of thousands of jobs. 
Chancellor Schmidt def ended the sale on the grounds that 
the "relevant question was not whether a country like 
Brazil should obtain such technology but when it will."(8} 
The West Germans were also convinced that the Americans had 
stooped to shady business tactics in earlier West German 
nuclear deals in order to steal potential clients for 
themselves. They cited incidents in Yugoslavia in 1973 and 
a similar case in Spain, both of which led them to believe 
that the U.S. might resort to this strategy with Brazil as 
well. The West Germans had gained the advantage over what 
would have been the American nuclear deal of the century. 
It was a reminder of the decline of U.S. exports in this 
area. In 1974, the Americans had controlled 66% of the 
market, but by 1976 it was under 50%.(9} 
After President Carter's election, the West Germans 
became uneasy about the future of their deal with Brazil. 
During the election campaign, the future President had made 
nuclear non-proliferation a major campaign issue and had 
been very critical of the Ford administration's nuclear 
policies. The West Germans began to wonder if the issue 
would be reopened. One of the first official actions of the 
Carter Presidency was to send Vice President Walter Mondale 
to the FRG in another effort to convince the Federal 
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Republic to either withhold the fuel technologies or place 
them under multinational control. His arguments did little 
to persuade the West Germans and in April 1977, having 
waited several months to see what policy the Carter 
Administration might adopt, Bonn began sending the plans 
for the fuel plant to Brazil. After intensive negotiations 
between the two countries, a compromise was reached in June 
1977. The U.S. lifted its opposition to the West German 
sale to Brazil and in return the FRG promised to 
temporarily halt the sale of nuclear recycling technology. 
The American government proposed an international dialogue 
evaluating the fuel cycle from the energy and 
non-proliferation viewpoint. This International Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference (INFCE) began meeting on 
19 October 1977 with 40 countries participating. It 
established eight working groups to deal with all aspects 
of the fuel cycle, and both the Americans and West Germans 
seemed satisfied. However, differing approaches to nuclear 
policy would again become evident over the development of 
the neutron bomb. 
3. The Neutron Bomb 
For a period of years, NATO had urged the development 
of a new nuclear weapon which would not totally destroy the 
area to be defended. Unlike the old tactical nuclear 
weapons, this device would cause less fallout, more 
concentrated radiation, and a reduced blast effect. This 
weapon, the enhanced-radiation or fusion warhead, known as 
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the neutron bomb, was developed during the 1960s in the 
United States but never put into production and thus was 
forgotten by the public. 
In late 1977, the Carter Administration decided to 
move forward with the production of the neutron bomb due 
both to the three-to-one tank advantage of the Warsaw Pact 
in Central Europe and as part of a NATO missile 
modernization plan.(10) The U.S. position on the neutron 
bomb was based on the assumption that, unlike theater 
nuclear weapons, the neutron bomb would cause little 
collateral damage and could be used during an attack by 
Warsaw Pact forces. The President made it quite clear that 
he would not begin production until its deployment was 
accepted by America's allies, especially the Federal 
Republic. 
The West Germans debated the issue for almost a year 
without reaching a clear consensus. Chancellor Schmidt 
came under intense pressure from the West German public, 
his party, and from Moscow to reject deployment of the 
weapon. Due to the limited range of the bomb, many West 
Germans feared that it would make a conventional conflict 
in Europe escalate quickly into a localized nuclear war. 
It would be possible for the U.S. to engage in a nuclear 
confrontation with the Warsaw Pact on West German soil with 
little risk to the American homeland. Egon Bahr, now the 
Secretary General of the SPD, denounced the weapon as a 
"symbol of mental perversion." Retired West German Air 
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Force General Johannes Steinhoff stated that he was "in 
favor of retaining nuclear weapons as political tools but 
not permitting them to become battlefield weapons •.. " 
He was quoted as saying, "I am firmly opposed to their 
[nuclear weapons] tactical use on our soil. I cannot favor 
a nuclear war on German territory while the two superpowers 
observe safely at a distance."(11) 
President Carter's approach, to allow NATO members to 
accept or reject the bomb unhindered by American pressure, 
eventually brought private West German acceptance in 
January 1978. Chancellor Schmidt wanted the bomb, but did 
not want to say so publicly. Both sides agreed to a 
compromise on the issue. The President would announce that 
development of the bomb had been completed, but that he 
would like to talk to the U.S.S.R. before production 
began. If the Soviets were unwilling to make concessions 
during the concurrent SALT II talks, he would tell the NATO 
allies that the negotiations have failed. Carter would 
then announce that he has decided to produce the neutron 
bomb and that it will be stationed in the Federal Republic 
and at least one other European country. 
Debate on the issue continued and in the end the 
President did not stick to his agreement, announcing 
instead that the bomb would not be produced. This 
unilateral rejection of the bomb resulted in a trip to 
Washington by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, whereupon the President announced that neutron 
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production had not been stopped, but simply postponed. 
Quite possibly, this change in American policy was the 
result of mounting U.S. internal political pressure on 
Carter, who in turn did not wish to force the bomb on 
another country. It is also possible that Carter saw less 
need for the bomb, especially in light of the floundering 
SALT II negotiations with the Soviets. 
For the FRG, the Schmidt government suffered a loss of 
prestige among the West German electorate. The SPD had 
been split on the issue and the CDU had accused the Schmidt 
government of wavering in the face of Soviet criticism of 
the neutron bomb. It seemed clear though, that in this 
issue, the Schmidt government was more to blame than 
President Carter. Bonn obviously wanted the bomb, or 
Foreign Minister Genscher would not have traveled to 
Washington when production postponement was announced. 
However, the Federal Republic wanted to be pushed into 
accepting the bomb rather than openly professing its desire 
for it. 
4. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
Further pressure was placed on the U.S.-FRG 
relationship during the Carter years with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In 1978, a Marxist coup 
in Afghanistan placed a pro-Soviet government in control of 
their strategic country. However, in 1979, the new 
government began to falter and came under increasing 
pressure from Islamic groups both inside and outside the 
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country. By the end of the year, it had become apparent to 
many Soviet advisors that the country was on the brink of 
disintegration.(12) On the night of 24 December 1979, a 
large number of Soviet troops entered the capital of Kabul 
and took over the city. 
The significance of this invasion was not lost on the 
American government. The invasion meant that the Soviets 
would now be poised along vast stretches of territory 
bordering important oil fields in Iran and important trade 
routes in Iran and Pakistan. 
President Carter responded on 8 January 1980 by 
stating that "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the 
greatest threat to world peace since the Second World 
War."(13) In his State of the Union Address fifteen days 
later, Carter added that "an attempt by an outside force to 
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as 
an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It 
will be repelled by use of any means necessary including 
military force."(14) This proclamation became known as the 
Carter Doctrine. 
Many Americans viewed the invasion of Afghanistan as 
another incident in a long line of Soviet adventures in the 
late 1970s, including activity in Angola, Ethiopia, and 
South Yemen. In June 1978, Carter stated that detente must 
be based on reciprocal restraint, whereas the Soviet Union 
had expolited detente to cover "a continuing aggressive 
struggle for political advantage and increased influence in 
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a variety of ways."{15) "Detente is dead" proclaimed the 
Washington Post.(16) 
As punitive measures against the Soviets for their 
recent action, the U.S. announced a grain embargo, 
introduced restrictions on technology transfer to the 
U.S.S.R., promised to increase U.S. defense spending by 
five percent annually, and asked its allies to join in a 
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. European governments 
viewed the events in Afghanistan as a struggle between East 
and West which should lead to no major adjustments in 
western defense policy or to economic or even symbolic 
reprisals against the Soviet Union. Many in Europe stresed 
the defensive motives of the Soviet Union and claimed once 
again that the U.S.S.R. was merely reacting to the trauma 
caused by encirclement and past invasions rather than 
expanding their empire through military means. SPD 
chairman Willy Brandt emphasized the importance of 
condemning Soviet action without "overreacting and 
returning to the Cold War."{17) 
The lines across the Atlantic were indeed clear. 
President Carter had essentially abandoned the use of 
detente as a means of controling Soviet action. West 
Germany, however, did not wish to risk losing or limiting 
intra-European detente which had provided them with 
tangible benefits. The FRG was now in the dilemma of 
either supporting the U.S. and its sanctions or maintaining 
its desire for Ostpolitik with the Soviet Union. After 
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considerable pressure Chancellor Schmidt reluctantly agreed 
to boycott the 1980 Olympics. 
CHAPTER IV 
OSTPOLITIK IN THE ERA OF CONFRONTATION: 1980-1984 
The leaders of both the United States and FRG faced 
reelection in 1980. Conservative Republican Ronald Reagan 
challenged and defeated Jimmy Carter in the November 
election. A major theme of Reagan's campaign was the 
military imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
If elected, he promised to close this "window of 
vulnerability" and restore American military might and 
prestige in the world as a whole. During the era of 
detente, the Western Alliance strove to curb Soviet 
adventurism by enmeshing them in a net of trade and 
technology transfers, credit lines, and arms control 
agreements. Once involved, the Soviets would be unwilling 
to risk peace and prosperity for the pleasures of 
territorial aggrandizement. Reagan felt that U.S.-Soviet 
detente had been used solely to the Moscow's advantage, as 
a ". . .one way street that the Soviet Union has used to 
pursue its own aims." He claimed the Soviets had reserved 
"unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to 
cheat."(l) Having little to lose from the breakdown of 
superpower detente, Reagan responded to the perceived 
Soviet threat with sanctions and rearmament. 
The new Administration tended to view global issues 
and problems within the scope of the East-West conflict and 
saw NATO as a key element in a worldwide collective 
security arrangement against the Soviet Union. The 
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conflicts in Central America and the Middle East were both 
viewed as prime targets for Soviet military intervention. 
President Reagan believed that increased defense spending 
was the best answer to the Soviet rejection of detente. The 
Soviets must be kept out of the Third World through the use 
of military force. In spite of former President Carter's 
1980 increase in defense spending, the Reagan 
Administration expanded the American military budget by 
seven percent for each of the next five years. This 
increase totaled $1,280.6 billion by the end of 1986, about 
$200 billion more than the program instituted by President 
Carter. This amount was the largest peacetime military 
expenditure in American history.(2) 
In West Germany, Chancellor Schmidt was opposed in the 
October 1980 election by Franz Josef Strauss of the 
Christian Social Union (the Bavarian sister of the CDU). 
The SPD campaigned with the slogan "Security for the 
Eighties," clearly emphasizing continuity, stability and 
preserving the status quo. The October election resulted 
in the SPD/FDP coalition gaining a 45 seat advantage over 
the CDU/CSU, thus returning Schmidt to the Chancellor's 
office.(3) 
Schmidt and the West Germans, as well as many West 
Europeans, had great misgivings about President Reagan's 
"revitalization of containment." The demise by 1980 of 
U.S.-Soviet detente had also become a threat to the 
European-Soviet detente, which the West Germans desperately 
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wanted to maintain. Since the initiation of Brandt's 
Ostpolitik, governments of the FRG had insisted in the 
maintenance of the process of detente as a method of 
reducing tensions in Europe. We will "defend detente tooth 
and nail" stated West Germany's Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher.(4) 
Bonn believed that detente was an essential 
precondition to its security. The Western Alliance in 
general and West Germany in particular were dependent on 
American nuclear protection. However, if this nuclear 
protection was to be used, it would lead to a nuclear war 
which would be particularly devastating to West Germany. 
The American rearmament effort signaled to many West 
Europeans the beginning of a new arms race. The Schmidt 
government felt that Soviet advances, especially in the 
Third World, could be best met by treating the causes that 
produced them, particularly poverty and subsequent 
government instability. In addition, the reassociation 
between the two Germanies was dependent on European 
detente. Since the early 1970s, approximately 300,000 
ethnic Germans had been allowed to emigrate from Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. An estimated three million 
Germans still remained, their movement dependent on good 
relations between Bonn and Moscow. Counting their tangible 
benefits, Europe and especially the West Germans felt that 
the ensuing times of tension called for more, rather than 
less detente. 
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Further tension in the Western Alliance was evidenced 
by several statements and decisions from the Reagan 
Administration in 1981 regarding nuclear weapons. In 
August, President Reagan announced the decision to produce 
the neutron bomb that had been scuttled during the Carter 
Presidency. This decision was responsible for a major 
outcry in Europe, where it was argued that the weapon would 
only be suitable for use against a possible Soviet attack 
in Western Europe. 
European fears increased even further when President 
Reagan stated during a news conference that he "could see 
where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons 
against troops in the field without it bringing either one 
of the major powers to pushing the button."(5} This view 
was seemingly confirmed several weeks later by Secretary of 
State Alexander M. Haig, who commented before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that a nuclear explosion could 
be used in Europe "for demonstration purposes" against a 
Soviet conventional attack. One day later, Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger disputed Haig's contention, 
stating that "there is nothing in any [NATO] plan that I 
know of that contains anything remotely resembling that 
[demonstration blast], nor should there be."(6} Many 
Europeans viewed these two statements with confusion and 
pointed to them as examples of President Reagan's lack of 
commitment to arms reduction and peace. 
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1. The INF Missiles in Europe 
Without a doubt, the issue that caused the greatest 
concern for the NATO Alliance during the early 1980s was 
the stationing of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
in Western Europe. Throughout the Netherlands, Italy, 
Great Britain, and West Germany, millions demonstrated 
against the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II 
missiles. When coupled with the remarks of President 
Reagan and Secretary of State Haig, many Europeans felt the 
stationing of new missiles was meant to localize the 
dangers of nuclear war, shifting the nuclear threat from 
the United States to Europe. A West German government poll 
in the spring of 1980 revealed that citizens opposed the 
stationing of more and new atomic weapons on the soil of 
the Federal Republic by 60 percent to 24. Respondents 
favored military neutrality of the FRG and GDR by a 45 to 
34 percent margin.(7) 
It had been West German Chancellor Schmidt who had 
urged NATO to modernize its nuclear force in Europe during 
a speech given in October 1977. This proposal was based on 
several developments of the late 1970s that seemed to 
weaken America's nuclear deterrent.(8) 
Due to the fact that the U.S. itself was not 
particularly vulnerable to a land-based Soviet invasion, 
only a creditable second-strike nuclear capability was 
necessary to defend itself. However, because Western 
Europe was vulnerable to such an attack, the U.S. deterrent 
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must include a first-strike capability to sufficiently meet 
a Soviet conventional attack. During the late 1970s, with 
the advent of approximate Soviet-American parity in 
strategic weapons, this strategy would now mean that 
American as well as European cities would be vulnerable to 
a Soviet response if nuclear weapons were used. The West 
Europeans began to question Washington's willingness to use 
nuclear weapons to save Europe in the event of a Soviet 
attack. 
A second development of the late 1970s was the 
increased accuracy of the land based intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of the Soviet Union. A U.S. 
first-strike in Europe would become undesirable due to the 
fact that a Soviet response could destroy all or most of 
the U.S. ICBMs, thus rendering huge losses in the U.S. and 
Europe while leaving the U.S.S.R. virtually untouched. 
A final development was the massive buildup of Soviet 
SS-20 missiles in the western Soviet Union aimed at Western 
Europe. These mobile missiles were equipped with multiple 
warheads, making them far superior to NATO's Pershing I's. 
In December of 1979 NATO agreed to begin modernizing 
its nuclear deterrent by stationing a total of 572 medium 
range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, with deployment 
beginning in December of 1983. Prior to this deployment 
the U.S. and the Soviets were to begin arms control 
negotiations. This decision became known as the 
"two-track" agreement. During the previous 30 years of the 
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Alliance, nuclear procurement decisions had been made by 
the United States and afterwards, through bilateral 
arrangement, specific countries were asked to deploy the 
new weapons. This concept had been discarded during the 
neutron bomb debate of 1978 and was again scrapped during 
the INF discussions. Before the new weapons were even 
produced, American allies were asked to commit to 
deployment on their soil. Initially, the U.S. view was 
that this deployment was unnecessary but intended to 
reassure the European allies that the defense of Europe 
would remain coupled to an American strategic response. It 
was meant also as a visible sign of American support 
against the mounting number of Soviet SS-20s. This visible 
sign soon became the center of controversy. When the 
Reagan administration did not pursue the second track of 
the two-track agreement, i.e. negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, thousands of Europeans took to the streets in 
protest of the scheduled December 1983 deployment.(9) 
Faced with mounting criticism and pressure from its 
allies, President Reagan agreed to begin negotiations with 
the Soviet Union in December 1981. He called for the 
Soviets to dismantle all of the recently deployed SS-20s in 
central Europe in return for an American agreement not to 
deploy the Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western 
Europe. This proposal became known as the "zero option" 
which had been earlier discussed by Helmut Schmidt. The 
President further proposed to resume negotiations on 
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strategic nuclear weapons in June 1982, discussions that 
became known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
(START). When little progress was made at the INF talks in 
Geneva, the Peace Movement in Western Europe, especially in 
the FRG, greatly increased during 1982 and 1983. 
Washington began to question Schmidt's ability to carry 
through on the proposed INF deployment in 1983.(10) 
2. The Development of the Greens 
One of the most important trends in West German 
politics during the 1970s and 1980s was the rise of the 
Greens, a party formed outside the mainstream of West 
German party politics. While this movement was present in 
other West European countries, it was more pronounced in 
the FRG. This was due mainly to the centrist nature of the 
major parties and the lack of a viable left-wing 
alternative.(11) 
Additionally, there was a rise of anti-Western 
attitudes among West Germany's left wing that had no 
historical contact with trans-Atlantic cooperation 
following World War II. This group began to increasingly 
call for the FRG to find a "third way" between the two 
superpowers. Coupled with unease about American 
willingness to use the nuclear deterrent was a general 
rejection of the trends of American society, including 
American replacement of detente with rearmament, the 
conservative swing in American politics, and the severe 
cutbacks in American social welfare programs. These two 
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elements together helped produced the large amount of 
anti-Americanism the Peace Movement became known for.(12) 
The Peace Movement of the early 1980s encompassed a 
broad political spectrum, from communists to clergymen, 
from ecologists to military men, from the youth of the SPD 
and FDP to the members of the media. It was led in West 
Germany by the Green Party, whose growth was fueled 
initially be an internal SPD split over the NATO INF 
decision. 
The Green Party began in 1982 and 1983 to challenge 
the West German INF commitment. America began to view the 
implementation of the deployment program as a test for the 
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Alliance and a collapse of support as a sure sign of the 
"Finlandization" of Europe.(13) This was one reason the 
Reagan Administration was pleased with the election by the 
Bundestag of Helmut Kohl as chancellor in October 1982, who 
soon after his election vowed to maintain West Germany's 
INF commitment. However, Kohl also attempted to influence 
the United States and Soviet Union to reach an agreement in 
Geneva before the day for deployment was reached. He met 
with Soviet leaders in July 1983 and sent Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko in October of the same year. Bonn also 
pressured the Reagan Administration to accept the concept 
of an interim solution which would trade a reduced number 
of SS-20s for a reduced number of Cruise and Pershing II 
missiles. In July 1983, Kohl visited the United States and 
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urged the suspending of the stationing of Pershing II 
missiles during the Geneva negotiations. 
During the fall of 1983 between two and three million 
West Germans demonstrated against the impending deployment 
of the INF weapons. At a special November 1983 party 
congress, the SPD clearly rejected the NATO two-track 
agreement and the stationing of new nuclear weapons in West 
Germany. Helmut Schmidt's motion in favor of deployment 
received only 14 out of 400 votes.(14) 
In spite of growing opposition to the stationing of the 
missiles, the West German Bundestag voted later in November 
to support deployment as scheduled. In response, the 
Soviets suspended both the INF and START talks. 
The position of the Kohl government was to attempt to 
revive the arms control discussions and dialogue between 
the two countries. In the words of Foreign Minister 
Genscher, the Atlantic Alliance must be ready for 
"dialogue, negotiations and cooperation on equal terms with 
the East, with the aim of keeping a check on the East-West 
conflict and reducing tensions."(15) 
3. The Trade Issue 
The West German readiness for dialogue and 
negotiations can be illustrated with the issue of trade and 
technology transfer to the Eastern bloc. It was very clear 
that the FRG and Americans held differing views regarding 
the effects of trade on East-West relations. 
The Federal Republic looked at trade with the Soviets 
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as a way to develop and enhance long-term relations. West 
Germany felt the U.S.S.R. was economically self-sufficient 
and not reliant on the West. Hopes that the Soviets would 
curtail their massive arms build-up and restrain themselves 
in the Third World were unfounded. Western economic 
relations had not reached a level large enough to induce 
political concessions from the Soviet Union. According to 
Foreign Minister Genscher, the Soviet economy was made up 
of two components, a military economy and a civilian one, 
of which the military held absolute priority.(16} 
In addition to this lack of leverage, the Europeans 
questioned the effect of economic sanctions on the U.S.S.R. 
as compared with the West. The U.S. grain embargo imposed 
by President Carter in 1979 was seen to have a major effect 
on American farmers while having a minimal effect on the 
Soviets. The Washington Post estimated that if trade of 
finished products with the Soviet Union were to be cut in 
half during the years 1982 and 1983, the Soviet GNP would 
be reduced by $4.5 billion while the Western GNP would be 
reduced by $30 billion.(17} In Bonn, trade was a means by 
which the Soviet Union could be incorporated into 
international economic interdependence. Instead of linking 
trade, credits, and the transfer of technology to the good 
behavior of the Soviets, Bonn felt that Moscow's economic 
problems should be used to demonstrate to the Soviets how 
much they could prof it from peaceful cooperation with the 
West. Once Moscow realized this, there would be a chance 
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that they would not wish to jeopardize this cooperation 
through acts of violence such as Afghanistan. The motto 
was change through trade.(18) 
For the Americans and the Reagan Administration, trade 
with the East was first and foremost a political instrument 
to be used for rewarding or punishing the behavior of the 
Soviet Union. The U.S. had generally discarded the view 
that strong trade relations could produce stable relations 
with Moscow. The State Department was especially critical 
of technology transfers to the Soviets, citing enhanced 
military capabilities and a need for an increased Western 
military buildup as a result. 
The U.S. demonstrated their views on trade with the 
East after General Wojciek Jaruzelski declared martial law 
in Poland and attempted to break-up the Polish trade union 
Solidarity in December 1981. President Reagan responded by 
imposing sanctions on the U.S.S.R. and Poland and asked the 
allies to do the same.(19) 
However, as was the case in 1979 after Afghanistan, 
the European allies were reluctant to impose sanctions on 
the Soviets. The Reagan Administration felt the 
dismantling of Solidarity was a move by Moscow to quash the 
forces of freedom and democracy in Poland. The Schmidt 
government viewed these events as an internal Polish matter 
in which they should not become involved. Bonn's 
government spokesman Kurt Becker stated that the crucial 
"question is whether martial law was an autonomous Polish 
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decision as we believe, or whether the American belief is 
true that the Polish government did not act within its own 
competence and the Soviet Union was behind the action."(20) 
In June 1982 at the Western Economic Summit in 
Versailles, France, the United States attempted to force 
the other Western Alliance nations to coordinate their 
Eastern economic trade policies with the United States. 
This position was rejected by the summit participants. 
Divergence between the FRG and the U.S. on the trade 
issue was most pronounced over the Siberian natural gas 
pipeline. During the 1970s, natural gas became an 
important source of fuel for the Europeans. After the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
oil embargo of 1973, there was a realization that the West, 
and especially the FRG, was overdependent for its energy 
needs on the Middle East region. A reduction of this 
dependence became a central element in the energy policies 
of most industrial nations, including the U.S. and FRG. 
The European nations were much more dependent on oil 
imports than the U.S. and they began to view natural gas as 
a viable alternative to imported oil. The volume of 
natural gas consumed in Western Europe increased by 
approximately 50 percent between 1973 and 1980.(21) Faced 
with the increased demand for natural gas and a limited 
amount of European gas reserves, it was only natural that 
other sources for the fuel would soon be sought. Thus, the 
Europeans looked to the Soviet Union, whose reserves were 
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massive. Moreover, energy sales by the Soviets would aid 
European steel markets, which contracted European firms to 
manufacture the steel pipe needed for gas pipeline 
construction. In addition, Bonn viewed the expanded 
East-West commerce as a means for facilitating political 
ties useful for moderating Soviet behavior. 
Negotiations for the controversial Siberian natural 
gas pipeline began in 1980. The 3,500 mile pipeline would 
supply 40 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe after 1984 
and would run from the Urengoi gas fields in northwest 
Siberia through Czechoslovakia to Waidhaus, West Germany. 
At Waidhaus, the pipeline would hook on to an existing 
European grid, where gas would be distributed to France, 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria. After long 
and tough bargaining, a contract between the leading German 
gas distributor, Ruhrgas AG, and the Soviets was signed on 
20 November 1981. This agreement would mean that by 1990, 
the FRG would be importing 24 percent of its natural gas 
from the U.S.S.R. and approximately 5 percent of its total 
energy supplies.(22) 
The Americans tried repeatedly to persuade the 
Europeans not to sign this agreement. They argued that 
although Europe would only be dependent on the U.S.S.R. for 
about 6 percent of their total energy supplies, they must 
look beyond the aggregate numbers to more fundamental 
energy security considerations. The pipeline would earn 
the Soviet Union $10 billion a year in foreign exchange 
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which would enable the U.S.S.R. to buy Western technology 
on the world market, mainly advanced technology to aid the 
massive Soviet arms build-up. The Reagan Administration 
wanted to link East-West trade, including technology 
transfer, export credits, and trade of agricultural 
products to overall Soviet behavior. The general feeling 
of the President was that increased technology transfer 
enhanced the Soviet military capability. 
Washington also believed that the pipeline increased 
the dependence of Western Europe in general, and the 
Federal Republic in particular, on the Soviets for their 
energy so as to allow the Kremlin political leverage in an 
East-West crisis. Assistant Secretary of State Robert 
Hormats warned that "in the past the Soviet Union has used 
energy exports as a political lever, interrupting supplies 
to Yugoslavia, Israel, and China among others."(23) 
President Reagan, when questioned about Europe's natural 
gas deal, asked "Do they want to be dependent on someone 
who has 900 nuclear warheads aimed at them?"(24) 
The basic American argument was that the natural gas 
contract would relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union 
exerted by their own economic problems. They questioned 
the Europeans' purpose in granting subsidized export 
credits to the Soviets. Washington held that by granting 
the Soviets interest rates of 7.8 percent, the Europeans 
would underwrite some of the cost as well as most of the 
risk involved with the project. The hardliners in the 
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Reagan Administration believed that by exerting pressure on 
Moscow through a tough economic stance, eventually the 
Soviets would either relent on their massive defense 
build-up or watch their economy crumble. As an alternative 
to the gas pipeline deal, the Americans suggested an 
increase in the amount of American coal imported for 
European energy use.(25) 
After the crackdown on the Polish trade union 
Solidarity by General Jaruzelski, President Reagan 
announced a suspension of the export licenses of U.S. 
companies selling pipeline technology to the U.S.S.R. for 
the construction of the Siberian pipeline. Reagan's tough 
stance toward the Soviets and the pipeline was made even 
tougher with the announcement in June 1982 of an extension 
of the earlier sanctions on pipleine technology. The new 
sanctions were to include "equipment produced abroad under 
licenses issued by U.S. companies as well as subsidiaries 
of U.S. companies."(26) The President erroneously believed 
that the extension of these sanctions would favorably 
advance the position of the people of Poland. 
This new development deeply disturbed Bonn and the 
Europeans. The West Germans emphasized that the latest 
sanctions were in contradiction to agreements reached at 
the economic summit at Versailles in June 1982. The 
countries at the summit agreed "to pursue a prudent and 
diversified economic approach to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern 
Europe" and agreed to "work together to control exports of 
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strategic materials" as well as to apply "commercial 
prudence in limiting export credits."(27) The Europeans 
were also angered by the prospect that many workers would 
lose their jobs and saw the action as an attempt to 
interfere in their policymaking decisions. The Europeans 
felt there were serious inconsistencies in the Reagan 
position. While the President was attempting to scuttle 
the pipeline deal, in July 1982 he decided to extend the 
sale of American wheat to the Soviet Union for another 
year. 
By July 1982, it was apparent that the West Germans, 
as well as other European governments, and the Americans 
were on divergent policy courses. Bonn viewed the 
sanctions as a move by Washington to exert leadership in 
the Western Alliance. Especially angered that the U.S. did 
not even consult them before imposing the sanctions, former 
West German Finance Minister Manfred Lahnstein told the 
Bundestag that "U.S. action violates the basis of faith and 
credibility in international relations," and Economics 
Minister Otto Lambsdorff stated that "the pipeline would be 
built, embargo or no embargo."(28) The Europeans continued 
to defy the embargo and ship pipeline technology to the 
Soviets. 
The West Germans backed up their words with action. 
On 13 July 1982, a consortium of German Banks guaranteed 
credits of DM 2.8 billion at 7.8 percent interest to the 
Soviets for pipeline use, with 85 percent of the loan 
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backed by Bonn.(29) Other counter actions were considered, 
including attacking the U.S. law in world courts and 
international bodies and imposing duties on the $9 billion 
in annual farm exports to the European Community. At risk 
for the U.S. was $52 billion a year in exports to the EC, 
which in 1981 earned the Americans a bilateral trade 
surplus of $18 billion as well as billions in profit earned 
by U.S. multinationals in Europe.(30) 
It was clear to the Europeans that the U.S. had 
considerable flexibility in deciding how hard to punish the 
sanction violators. Penalties ranged from token fines to 
such drastic measures as the severance of all U.S.-European 
business relations. Before the Versailles summit, the 
Administration told the Europeans that U.S. action on the 
pipeline issue would be influenced by negotiations on 
curbing export credit subsidies. It would now be difficult 
to offer further tradeoffs due to the linkage with the 
easing of tensions in Poland. From the American point of 
view, the sanctions had to be enforced or the President's 
credibility would have been severely questioned, both in 
the U.S. and abroad as well. 
Finally, after months of negotiation, a solution to 
the problem appeared. Impetus for the settlement came from 
U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who won allied 
backing for an agreement on curbing credit to the East. He 
was also responsible for convincing President Reagan that 
an agreement with the allies would be a better policy in 
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the long run than maintaining the rift in the Alliance 
caused by the sanctions. 
In November 1982, President Reagan reached a 
compromise agreement with the European allies and decided 
to lift the embargo on American subsidiaries in Europe and 
companies operating under American licensing agreements. 
This agreement, as released by President Reagan, included a 
ban on trade agreements that contributed to the Soviet 
military capability, with a special emphasis on products 
that involved high technology. It strengthened the 
controls on strategic items through the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) and 
established procedures to monitor financial relations with 
the U.S.S.R. The language of the new agreement was similar 
to that of the Versailles Communique and appeared to be 
only a face saving measure for President Reagan. That fact 
was echoed by a West German official in Bonn, who stated 
that the agreement was an attempt by the allies to let Mr. 
Reagan abandon the sanctions without a loss of 
prestige.(31) In August 1983, President Reagan even 
dropped the embargo on the export of pipe-laying equipment 
to the Soviets. The President realized that this crisis 
over the pipeline had taken relations in the Western 
Alliance to their lowest level in many years. 
4. Inter-German Relations 
Despite their original opposition to the Ostpolitik 
begun by Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, the Christian 
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Democrats under Helmut Kohl have been consistent supporters 
of the process of European detente. The maintenance of 
friendly relations with the Soviets was a consistent theme 
of early statements by Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister 
Genscher both on the July 1983 state visit to Moscow and 
after the September shooting down of a Korean airliner by 
the Soviets. One of the most important benefits of 
European detente for West Germany has been the steady 
improvement of inter-German relations after the signing of 
the 1972 Basic Treaty. Since that time, several million 
citizens of West Berlin and West Germany have on an annual 
basis been able to visit friends and relatives in the 
German Democratic Republic. East Germany has also allowed 
20,000 political prisoners to emigrate to the FRG for which 
Bonn had to pay approximately 2 billion marks.(32) 
Even during the period of tension during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, inter-German relations were for the 
most part strengthened and improved. Initially, the East 
Germans were concerned about the October 1982 change in 
government in the FRG. The Christian Democrats had never 
accepted Ostpolitik and had deplored practically every 
inter-German accord, including the Basic Treaty. Many 
leaders of the party, including Bavarian Prime Minister 
Franz Josef Strauss, seemed committed to the radical 
anti-communism of the 1950s. However, once in power, the 
CDU/FDP coalition accepted all the inter-German agreements 
and committed itself to the continuation of Ostpolitik. 
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Humanitarian improvements in the inter-German 
relationship were readily apparent as well, as Kohl opened 
the Berlin-Hamburg highway which had been financed mainly 
by West German capital. During early 1983, 46,000 East 
Germans received exit visas to West Germany, twice the 
number of 1982. In July 1983, Strauss made a most dramatic 
announcement of a $380 million unrestricted loan to the 
GDR. This loan helped the East German government during a 
time of great financial strain and allowed inter-German 
relations to prosper despite the looming INF deployment. 
Negotiations were held in mid-1983 on nine different 
issues, including river and air pollution, the safety of 
nuclear reactors in border areas, science and technology, 
cultural exchanges, and the upgrading of transit routes. 
The GDR accelerated the dismantling of automatic shrapnel 
guns along the inter-German border and abolished the 
minimum currency exchange for children under age 15. Even 
the popular West German rock star Udo Lindenberg, who had 
ridiculed East German Communist party chief Erich Honecker 
in a popular song after having been denied permission to 
perform in East Germany, was finally allowed to play in 
East Berlin.(33) 
A second West German loan for $300 million was 
cancelled by Kohl during late 1983 when more significant 
concessions from East Berlin were not forthcoming. Tension 
was evident between the two Germanies as the impending INF 
deployment date approached and many felt that this issue 
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would cause a crisis in inter-German relations.(34) 
In the months following initial deployment of the 
Cruise and Pershing II missiles, the GDR offered a 
startling surprise. Instead of joining Moscow in its harsh 
criticism of the U.S. and FRG, Honecker and the East 
Germans expressed their desire to "limit the damage" caused 
to detente by the stationing of these missiles. In a move 
toward a more independent foreign policy in 1984, the GDR 
refused to freeze inter-German relations as requested by 
Moscow and instead intensified its desire for improved 
relations. East Germans openly criticized the Soviet 
announcement of new nuclear missile deployment intended to 
match that of NATO and only reluctantly boycotted the Los 
Angeles Summer Olympics of 1984. During the first half of 
1984, 31,000 people were permitted to emigrate to the West 
and in July the second FRG loan for $380 million was 
reinstated.(35) 
For the first time in almost 20 years West German 
government leaders openly talked about reunification. 
Helmut Kohl was the most outspoken post-war Chancellor in 
support of eventual reunification. He promised his 
government would not "accept a division of the fatherland" 
and made clear the existence of a "special relationship" 
between the two German states, whose commonalty included 
language, history, and strong human bonds.(36) Articles 
which appeared in the late 1970s stating that German 
reunification was a "dead issue" appear to have wrongly 
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forecast the death of German nationalism. Public opinion 
polls during the mid-1980s show wide support for German 
reunification.(37) President Reagan demonstrated a less 
enthusiastic response to these developments, informing Bonn 
that "careful consultations" were needed between the U.S. 
and FRG in order to maintain their friendship. However, in 
a November 1984 meeting with Chancellor Kohl, President 
Reagan reaffirmed American support for West German "efforts 
to lower the barriers between the two German states."(38) 
The two German states were clearly in closer harmony with 
each other during the mid-1980s than at any other time in 
the post-war era. 
CONCLUSION 
In analyzing the American-West German post-war 
relationship, the high degree of unity between the two 
countries is readily apparent. In spite of the 
disagreements which the partnership has endured during the 
post-war years, a common interest and concern has 
consistently evolved. The basis for this unity of purpose 
has been the common interest of both countries to withstand 
the threat of the Soviet Union. This threat has manifested 
itself in several key areas of the American relationship 
with West Germany, including views on the East-West 
conflict, the importance of detente, the role and structure 
of defense, each country's role in the Alliance, and 
economic relations with each other and the East. 
1. The East-West Conflict 
The American view of the threat from the Soviet Union 
was very different from that of the West Germans. The FRG 
saw the East-West conflict centered in Europe as a dispute 
between NATO on one side and the Warsaw Pact on the other. 
It was because of the division of Europe after World War II 
that NATO was formed in 1949. 
The Soviet threat in central Europe was of primary 
importance to the U.S. during the 1950s, but extended to 
Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Because of its status as a global power, 
Washington became increasingly involved toward the Soviet 
challenge in other parts of the world. 
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American policy of the 1950s and 1960s had been one of 
containment, meeting the challenge of communism whenever it 
presented itself.(l} During the 1970s, Nixon and Kissinger 
had hoped to induce the Soviet Union, through a policy of 
linkage, to modify its foreign policy, slow down its arms 
build-up, and refrain from military initiatives in the 
Third World. This would effectively freeze the military 
and political status quo on a global basis and allow the 
U.S. to reduce defense expenditures and relinquish its role 
as world policemen.(2} 
The hopes of the U.S. were not realized. While the 
U.S.S.R. desired stabilization of the status quo in Europe, 
Moscow continued its massive arms build-up and militarily 
intervened in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. The 
Americans viewed these events and the 1979 invasion of 
Afghanistan as a sign that the policy of linkage had 
failed. With a major military build-up of its own, 
sanctions against the Soviets, and withdrawal from 
ratification of the SALT II Treaty, President Carter 
signaled an end to the policy of linkage and a return to 
military strength and containment.(3} The election of 
Ronald Reagan confirmed the American return to these 
policies. The Reagan Administration viewed the United 
States in a global power conflict with the Soviets to be 
waged throughout the world. U.S. Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig stated at his first press conference that 
"the whole world had now become NATO's concern."(4} 
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Most European governments, including West Germany's, 
did not share this view. In contrast to President Carter, 
who viewed the Afghanistan invasion as a first step toward 
Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf and Western energy 
supplies, most Europeans felt the conflict was a regional 
issue outside the scope of NATO. While Washington imposed 
sanctions as a way of punishing Moscow and hoped it could 
force the Soviets to withdraw, Bonn wanted to continue 
cooperation with Moscow in hopes it could urge the Soviets 
to remove their troops. The Europeans felt that the Soviet 
invasion was defensive in nature and rejected the idea of 
the expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy. The 
offsetting of the Soviet threat posed by the SS-20s, either 
through increased defenses or disarmament, was incomparably 
more important than growing Soviet influence in the Third 
World. Thus, while the FRG continued its policy of viewing 
East-West problems from the standpoint of a regional power, 
the U.S. as a world power saw Soviet expansion as part of a 
more complex world conflict.(5} 
While differences between the U.S. and FRG in this 
area are evident, American foreign policy made a gradual 
shift in the late 1980s. Arms control became a priority 
for the U.S. and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan helped ease tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations. 
The conflict of interest between Washington and Bonn seemed 
much less severe than it did during the early 1980s. The 
dramatic changes in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s 
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and early in 1990 have yet to demonstrate what the future 
holds for the U.S.-FRG relationship. 
2. The Significance of Detente 
Throughout the 1960s, the various American 
administrations began a gradual move toward a policy of 
peaceful cooperation with the Soviets, a feeling that 
manifested itself in the era of negotiations initiated by 
Richard Nixon. Concomitantly, initially under the "Grand 
Coalition" government of 1966-1969 and especially with the 
election of Willy Brandt in 1969, the governments of West 
Germany began to adopt a similar policy. 
This did not mean that there were not moments of great 
tension between the two capitals, especially when one 
capital dealt with the adversary on a unilateral basis. 
When Kennedy appeared to soften America's stance on access 
to Berlin, on arms control, or on recognition of the German 
Democratic Republic, Konrad Adenauer became alarmed. When 
the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt began moving faster than the 
U.S. felt was best, Washington expressed concern. During 
the late 1970s, when the Carter Administration imposed 
sanctions on the Soviets and returned to the policy of 
containment and confrontation, Bonn was irritated. As the 
FRG maintained its policy of detente as a means of reducing 
military tension and improving contacts with the East, 
Washington feared West German "self-Finlandization" or 
neutralism. ( 6} 
The decade of detente provided few benefits for the 
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U.S. and in many ways Americans agreed with President 
Reagan that detente had been a "one way street" for the 
Soviets. In contrast, the years of detente had brought 
significant benefits to the Western European states, 
benefits they were unwilling to abandon. The FRG was the 
main beneficiary of this relaxation of tensions, 
particularly through the humanitarian and political 
benefits of the accommodation with the GDR after 1971. 
The increasing use of non-military rather than 
military means was indispensable for West Germany, since 
any potential conflict would result in the Germanies 
becoming a battlefield. Detente as a means of reducing 
military tensions was and still is vital for the Federal 
Republic. ( 7) 
This approach directly conflicted with the U.S. policy 
of confrontation and containment reinstated by Carter and 
Reagan. The Carter Administration needed Alliance 
solidarity for its sanctions after Afghanistan, as did 
President Reagan after his pipeline sanctions following the 
Polish crackdown in 1981. The refusal of the Europeans to 
support U.S. demands led to a great deal of bitterness and 
antagonism. Western Europe's failure to criticize the 
invasion of Afghanistan and Polish martial law led to cries 
of "self-Finlandization" from America.(8) 
Here, the essence of the differences between the two 
countries lies not in conflicting policies, but in 
priorities. While Washington favored defense over detente, 
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Bonn felt the opposite was best. The essence of their 
disagreements were due mainly to differences in geography 
and world political power, not in a loosening of ties with 
the West. 
3. Role and Structure of Defense 
European objections to U.S. policies grew stronger 
during the early 1980s. Hawkish Reagan rhetoric and 
references to fighting and winning a limited nuclear war in 
Europe led to new anxieties in wide parts of the European 
public. The fear of the 1960s and 1970s that the U.S. 
would not fight a war in Western Europe in the event of a 
Soviet attack gave way to the new fear that the U.S. would 
risk and attempt to limit nuclear war to the European 
theater. The INF debate, the rising West German peace 
movement, and the increasing neutralism of the left as 
witnessed by the SPD's 1983 rejection of NATO's two-track 
agreement, put even more distance between the U.S. and 
FRG. Many European governments, especially that of the 
FRG, were faced with two contradictory requirements. They 
had to preserve the unity of the Alliance in order to 
maintain their security, but also wanted to assert their 
independence to accommodate the popular will against the 
U.S. governments policy of strength.(9) 
Not only did the FRG have the biggest stake in a 
strong defense and in the continuance of detente, it was 
most closely watched by the two superpowers. In spite of 
its boycott of the Moscow Olympics and several attempts to 
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maintain loyalty to the U.S., the FRG bore the brunt of 
U.S. frustration with the Alliance. Although the West 
Germans worked hard at maintaining detente, it became the 
focus of Soviet pressure during the 1980s. 
The INF debate is the best example of the critical but 
temporary differences between the U.S. and the FRG. It was 
the government of Helmut Schmidt which called attention to 
the Soviet build-up of SS-20 missiles. This was a key 
factor in the implementation of NATO's two-track decision 
of 1979. As it gradually became more difficult for Bonn to 
guarantee its commitment to the new medium-range missiles, 
the Americans viewed the deployment as a test of Alliance 
strength. This switch in position was due mainly to the 
different assessment of the two NATO pillars of defense and 
detente. Bonn wished the Soviet SS-20s removed and failing 
this, only then desired implementing the deployment of 
Cruise and Pershing II missiles. Washington placed 
preeminence on the deployment and wished to negotiate 
through a position of strength. Here, the critical issue 
was how to meet the Soviet missile build-up, not whether it 
should be met. The difference between the two capitals was 
again found in which of the two tracks should be 
emphasized, defense or detente. 
Cries of "self-Finlandization" or neutralism have 
periodically been heard from Washington regarding Bonn's 
policies. However, when examining the West German 
commitment to NATO, the word neutral hardly applies. The 
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FRG's Bundeswehr has accounted for 50 percent of NATO's 
land force in central Europe, 30 percent of the combat 
aircraft, and 70 percent of NATO's Baltic naval fleet. In 
1982 it provided 7.6 percent of NATO's defense spending, 
behind only the nuclear powers America (65.1 percent), 
Britain (8.5 percent) and France (7.8 percent). In no 
other NATO country has there been such a concentration of 
military forces and nuclear weapons, of which the German 
government has no control.(10) 
Criticism of West Germany's desire for neutralism 
cannot be regarded as an accurate reflection of public 
opinion either within the West German government or on the 
streets of West Germany. A survey of the West German 
public revealed a desire for alliance compared with 
neutralism by 64 to 35 percent.(11) Similarly, 
pro-American opinion in West Germany reached a 56 percent 
high in September 1981, surpassed only in May 1965.(12) 
Large public protests held during the early 1980s had 
little to do with anti-Americanism. They were simply an 
expression of disappointment over the failure of arms 
control up to that time. These protests abated with the 
deployment of the medium range missiles beginning in 
December 1983 and the softening of President Reagan's 
anti-Soviet rhetoric during the mid-1980s. The fears 
within the Alliance of a general drifting apart have 
faded. Suspicion that inter-German relations would lead to 
German neutralism has disappeared. Helmut Kohl has been 
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allowed to become more aggressive in his pursuit of a 
closer relationship with East Germany during the late 
1980s, mainly due to the fact that no one has accused him 
of anti-Western sentiments. 
4. Role in the Alliance 
A similar conclusion can be drawn when examining the 
different roles each country plays in the Alliance. It is 
unquestioned that the FRG continues to be a special 
Atlantic partner, given its geographic position. 
Detente is essential to the West Germans due to the 
fact that even a small use of military force would have 
devastating effects on both Germanies. Bonn has continued 
to utilize Henry Kissinger's strategy of linkage as a means 
of stabilizing the conflict between East and West. The 
fact that Soviet leaders have more frequently visited Bonn 
than Washington and West German leaders have gone to Moscow 
during periods of icy relations between Americans and 
Soviets was symbolic of this special role. 
To allege, as some analysts have expressed, that 
increased contacts between West German officials and the 
Soviet Union might lead to West German neutralism is 
questionable in view of the FRG's consistent commitment to 
the Atlantic Alliance. Three West German Chancellors since 
the beginning of West German Ostpolitik have stated and 
restated their commitment to the West. Willy Brandt told 
the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany in 1978 that 
"the Alliance •.. is indispensable for every one of us [in 
83 
West Germany]."(13} Helmut Schmidt wrote in 1981 "the most 
important factor contributing to [West German] stability is 
and remains the partnership between Europeans and 
Americans."(14} Helmut Kohl stated on Austrian television 
that the "Federal Republic is tied to the West, it is not a 
wanderer between the blocs."(15} 
Bonn's Ostpolitik could not survive without a 
successful Westpolitik. The FRG has consistently 
demonstrated a solid commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. 
Given the fact its relations with the West are successful, 
it can work towards bridging the differences between East 
and West and reducing the tensions in Central Europe to a 
much greater degree. 
5. Economic Relations 
Harmony in West German-American relations is also 
readily apparent in light of overall economic relations and 
trade between the two countries. This unity has as its 
base West Germany's membership in the European Community. 
While trade between the two countries has increased 
dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s, each finds itself 
using trade with the East in a different manner. Under 
Presidents Carter and Reagan, the U.S. used trade as means 
to affect Soviet behavior, as was the case after the 
invasion of Afghanistan and crackdown in Poland. West 
Germany used trade to encourage acceptable Soviet political 
behavior, as was the case with the Siberian natural gas 
pipeline.(16} 
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Though economic relations cannot replace politics, 
they can and do provide an important foundation for 
improved political relations. They express both the 
dependability of American defense of West Germany and the 
commitment of the FRG's integration into the West. While 
the West Germans have been forced to remain dependent on 
the U.S. for their defense during the post-war period, 
through the EC they have been able to establish themselves 
as a partner on equal economic footing with the United 
States.(17) 
"We are the allies of the United States, not their 
vassals," spoke a West German politician in 1984.(18) 
While at times policies of either the U.S. or West Germany 
have caused temporary problems, after careful analysis it 
is clear that Bonn is not on the road to 
"self-Finlandization." The two important pillars of West 
Germany's foreign policy continue to be integration with 
the West and detente with the East, a policy which the Kohl 
government has continued to pursue.(19) Based on West 
German postwar history, the FRG seems to desire strong and 
continous integration in the West, especially the EC, while 
improving relations with the East. Konrad Adenauer decided 
to integrate West Germany into the West through NATO and 
the EC. This policy has been continued by his successors, 
Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and Helmut Kohl, while 
improving relations with the U.S.S.R., Poland, and other 
Eastern European countries. These aspects have remained 
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during the dramatic changes of 1989-1990. The Ostpolitik 
of the 1970s and 1980s contributed to an improvement of 
German-German relations, greater communication between the 
two states and the German people. Helmut Kohl is 
determined "not to miss the reunification train, which may 
not come at another time," while at the same time his 
government has remained committed to the West.(20) West 
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